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INTERVENTION AND CALLS FOR REFORM 
 
 
PAUL HARPUR* 
 
 
[Many Australian outworkers, especially recent immigrants 
working from home, currently endure poor working conditions. 
Outworkers often toil without traditional industrial support. 
Most retailers and suppliers do not monitor working conditions 
at the base of the supply chain. Occupational health and safety 
protections are often not enforced in practice. Increased 
obligations for retailers and suppliers at the top of the supply 
chain would reduce the violation of fair working conditions.]  
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Outworkers are some of the most vulnerable workers in Australia. In order to 
assist in protecting these workers, industrial commissions have provided 
outworkers protection in awards and legislatures have extended industrial and 
occupational health and safety (“OHS”) legislative protection to outworkers. 
Enforcing the laws which provide outworkers protection has been a difficult 
process. Rather than attempting to address all labour conditions, this article 
will focus entirely upon arguably the most serious labour condition: OHS. 
OHS protects outworkers’ most valuable resource: their health. Unlike 
violations of other labour conditions, such as unpaid wages, once an 
outworker has suffered a permanent disabling injury, that outworker must 
live with that injury for life. While unpaid remunerations can be later 
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recovered with interest, once an outworker’s body has a disabling injury, 
outworkers’ health can never be regained. 
 
This article will firstly explore the industry in which outworkers operate. 
Outworkers work at the bottom of supply chains, which involve retailers 
outsourcing work to suppliers who provide work to outworkers. This article 
will review research which demonstrates the economic, cultural and 
structural vulnerability of these outworkers. Secondly this article will explore 
the OHS concerns in outworking and how parliaments have sought to remedy 
the situation. The most common vehicle through which outworkers are 
provided OHS protection is through deeming provisions. Deeming provisions 
deem the supplier, and in some situations, other corporations, the employers 
of outworkers for the purposes of OHS legislation. As a consequence 
outworkers have all the protection afforded to standard employees. Despite 
having formal protection, the third part of this article compares outworkers’ 
statutory OHS entitlements verses research of their actual labour conditions. 
Finally this article explores how existing supply chain regulation over other 
labour conditions could be extended to afford outworkers increased 
protection.  
 
 
II SUPPLY CHAINS AND OUTWORKERS IN AUSTRALIA 
 
 A What is a supply chain? 
 
Supply chains are organisational structures developed to minimise costs for 
the parties at the top of the supply chain.
1 
Nossa, Johnstone and Quinlin refer 
to the party at the top of the supply chain as the ‘effective business 
controller’.
2
 To maximise their profits, the effective business controller 
purchases products on the most favourable terms to their enterprise. This 
approach creates competition between suppliers as to who can produce 
products cheapest and with the fastest turn around. To maintain their profits, 
the suppliers out source work to either outworkers or other organisations who 
                                                 
1
 Ananda Jeeva, Procurement dimensions in the Australian manufacturing sector: 
flexibility issues in a supply chain perspective (2004) PhD thesis, Curtin University; 
Peter Robertson, The impact of supply chain process integration on business 
performance (2006) University of Wollongong.  
2
 Igor Nossar, Richard Johnstone and Michael Quinlan, ‘Regulating Supply Chains to 
Address the Occupational Health and Safety Problems Associated with Precarious 
Employment: The Case of Home-Based Clothing Workers in Australia’ (2004) 17 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 137, 146, 51.  
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then outsource the work to outworkers. The outsourcing of work is generally 
structured as a commercial relationship, and not an employment relationship. 
The supplier supplying the work to the outworker generally requires the 
outworker to operate as a contractor. 
 
At each stage of the supply chain, competition forces the time and cost 
pressures to the bottom of the supply chain. Nossa, Johnstone and Quinlin 
observe that the effective business controller has the economic power to place 
considerable pressure upon the parties lower in the supply chain. The 
effective business controller’s quality control mechanisms can control both 
the quality of the products and the circumstances in which the products are 
produced. 
 
Scull, Nguyen and Woolcock found, the effective business controller 
provided the work to a Vietnamese middle man who distributed the work.
3
 
The effective business controller placed the middle men under considerable 
time and cost restraints, which were passed onto the outworkers at the bottom 
of the supply chain. Where the garments had faults, middle men were 
reported as refusing to pay outworkers for work performed. The outworkers 
were in a competitive market and were not in a position to refuse work. The 
competition and cost saving strategy of the effective business controller 
resulted in outworkers operating in adverse working conditions. 
 
Weller questioned whether the buyer-led model of supply chains was 
accurate for Australia.
4
 Despite this contention, she agreed the operation of 
supply chains resulted in the person at the bottom of the chain being under 
considerable pressure. Weller argued Australian supply chains can be divided 
into four segments: 
 
                                                 
3
 Sue Scull, My-Linh Nguyen and Geoff Woolcock Vietnamese Outworkers in 
Queensland: Exploring the Issues (2004) University of Queensland Boilerhouse 
Community Service and Research Centre, at 33-34. 
4
 Sally Weller, ‘Regulating Clothing Outwork: A Sceptic’s View’ (2007) 49 Journal 
of Industrial Relations, 1, 69-86, at 71; See also, Sally Weller Fashion's influence on 
garment mass production : Knowledge, commodities and the capture of value (2004) 
PhD thesis, Victoria University; Sally Weller ‘The embeddedness of global 
production networks: the impact of crisis in Fiji's garment export sector’ (2006) 38 
Environment and Planning Australia, 1249-1267; Sally Weller, ‘Fashion as viscous 
knowledge: fashion’s role in shaping trans-national garment production’ (2007) 7 
Journal of Economic Geography, 39-66. 
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(a) Brands that sell their products to a consumer market sensitive to 
the conditions of production;  
(b) Brands that sell their products to a consumer market more 
interested in price than the conditions of production;  
(c) Firms that are not brand owners (and are therefore not directly 
subject to the discipline of the consumer market) but which operate 
in accordance with the spirit and letter of industrial relations law; and 
(d) Firms that are not brand owners and which operate on a profit-
maximization basis.  
 
Weller argued segments (a) and (c) are likely to comply with regulation; 
however segments (b) and (d) were likely to attempt to avoid regulation, and 
should therefore be the focus of regulation. Research supports Weller’s 
position. For example, Scull, Nguyen and Woolcock found a large percentage 
of outworking occurs in Queensland at night time, in an attempt to avoid 
government and union officials who only work during regular working 
hours.
5
 In Queensland, inspectors are not prevented from accessing 
workplaces at irregular hours and can inspect domestic premises they 
‘suspect’ are a workplace, even if the workplace is upon domestic premises.
6
 
Requiring outworkers to work non-standard hours is especially effective in 
New South Wales and South Australia, as within those jurisdictions OHS acts 
require inspections of workplaces to occur at ‘reasonable times’ or during 
times work is ordinarily carried on at the workplace.
7
  
 
 
 B Outworkers in Australia 
 
The precise number of outworkers in Australia and their demography is 
uncertain. The outworker industry is largely invisible and hard to assess or 
regulate. It is difficult for governments to regulate a sector, of which they 
cannot even quantify. Reports prepared by Victorian government agencies 
have noted the precise number of outworkers in Australia is disputed, but 
                                                 
5
 Sue Scull, My-Linh Nguyen and Geoff Woolcock, above note 3, at 35. 
6
 Paragraph 104(1)c of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (QLD); however if 
the entry is under a warrant, the warrant will state times for entry of the workplace: 
see section 107. 
7
 Sub-section 77(3) of the Occupational Health And Safety Act 1989 (ACT); sub-
section 53(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW); subsection 
38(2) of the Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 (SA). 
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placed the figure between 50,000 and 329,000.
8
 This report noted that the 
Australian Tax Office used a figure of 50,000, while the TCFUA claimed the 
figure was near 329,000.
9
 The Queensland government noted the estimate of 
how many outworkers were in Australia varied from 50,000 to 330,000.
10
 
The Queensland government offered PhD funding in an attempt to clarify the 
number and reason this industry has low industrial relations laws compliance. 
In considering the OHS issues associated with outworkers, the Australian 
Capital Territory estimated there were approximately 329,000 outworkers in 
Australia.
11
 The New South Wales Industrial Commission estimated there 
were approximately 50,000 outworkers in New South Wales and 
approximately 17,000 unpaid family members assisting those outworkers.
12
 
Lozusic estimates there is between 129,000 and 329,007 outworkers in 
Australia.
13
 While the estimate of outworkers varies greatly, there is little 
doubt that the outworker industry includes tens of thousands of workers. 
 
The workers which operate as outworkers are largely made up of immigrant 
women, who have limited options for alternative employment.
14
 They work 
                                                 
8
 Victorian Office of Training and Tertiary Education Study Textile, Clothing, 
Footwear & Leather (TCF&L) Priorities Report (2004): 
<http://www.eduweb.vic.gov.au/edulibrary/public/voced/TCFL.pdf> at 1 November 
2007; the same figure was used by Economic Development Committee of Victoria 
Inquiry into Labour Hire Employment in Victoria (2005): 
<http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/ edic/inquiries/Labour_Hire/EDC-
FinalReport_LabourHireEmployment_2005-07.doc> at 9 November 2007. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Growing the Smart State Funding Program, Areas of Policy Research Interest for 
Queensland Government Agencies for 2005-2006: 
<http://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/library/office/Agency areas of research interest for 
2005.doc.> at 8 November 2007. 
11
 Australian Capital Territory Occupational Health and Safety Act 1989: Scope and 
Structure Review (2005). 
12
 NSW Department of Industrial Relations Behind the Label – The NSW 
Government Clothing Outwork Strategy Issues Paper (1999), at 8. 
13
 Roza Lozusic Outworkers - Briefing Paper (2002): 
<http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/A327D9892FC
6867FCA256ECF0007340E> at 31 October 2007. 
14
 Danger Research Group, Do consumers care about clothing outworker 
exploitation? (1999) 
<http://www.industrialrelations.nsw.gov.au/resources/consumer.pdf? at 1 November 
2007; Family And Community Development Committee Inquiry into the Conditions 
of Clothing Outworkers in Victoria September (2002), chapter 4: 
<http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/fcdc/PDF%20Files/Outworkers/Chapter%204.pd
f>. at 2 November 2007. 
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from their homes, and their workplaces are often not notified to any 
regulatory authority, so as far as regulation goes, they are invisible.
15
 Lacking 
fluent English, cultural assimilation and educational barriers, outworkers 
have limited options.
16
 Riordan Cregan interviewed 112 Australian 
outworkers and found systematic exploitation of recent immigrants.
17
 
Immigrants with little English were encouraged to borrow money to purchase 
sewing machines, and then were forced to continue working to repay the 
debts. The immigrant’s lack of cultural understanding and English fluency 
rendered them extremely vulnerable. Outworkers relied on people within 
their own cultural group for work. As outworkers were members of isolated 
cultural groups, often outworkers were scared to complain, as this would 
substantially impair their future employment prospects.
18
 
 
Moreover, for many outworkers, the outworking income was the family’s 
sole source of income.
19
  
 
The plight of outworkers has been subject to judicial attention. Riordan DP in 
Re Clothing Trades Award 1982 explained: 
 
The evidence and material in this case discloses a very distressing 
situation which has no place in a society which embraces the 
concepts of social justice. The undisputed facts reveal the existence 
of widespread and grossly unfair exploitation of migrant women of 
non-English speaking background who are amongst the most 
vulnerable persons in the workforce.
20
 
 
Expressing similar sentiments, Marshall J in Textile Clothing and Footwear 
Union of Australia v Southern Cross Clothing Pty Ltd explained: 
Outworkers in the clothing industry in Australia are some of the most 
exploited people in the Australian workforce. They perform garment 
making work often at absurdly low rates in locations outside their 
                                                 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 J Heyes and A Gray, ‘Homeworkers and the National Minimum Wage: Evidence 
from the Textiles and Clothing Industry’ (2001) 15 Work, Employment and Society 4, 
863-873. 
17
 Christina Cregan, Tales of despair: outworker narratives (2002).  
18
 TCFUA, The Hidden Cost of Fashion (1995) Sydney, Textile Clothing and 
Footwear Unions Federation of Australia, Sydney, at13-14. 
19
Christina Cregan, Home sweat home: preliminary findings of the first stage of a 
two-part study of outworkers in the textile industry in Melbourne (2001). 
20
 (1987) 19 IR 416 at 421. 
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employer's premises. This frequently occurs in the homes of 
outworkers.
21
 
 
The general structure of outworking renders outworkers vulnerable. Webber 
and Weller argued, outworker models exploited ethnic and gender divisions 
within communities.
22
 Through targeting recent migrants with limited 
employment options, supply chains were able to force outworkers to work in 
conditions which were lower than factory based employees.  
In addition to cultural issues, outworkers are generally isolated from other 
outworkers or traditional industrial support. Outworkers work often from 
their domestic residence. For example, Glynn J in the New South Wales Pay 
Equity Inquiry found outworkers were operating: 
 
• In the outworker’s residential lounge room and dining room; 
• In the outworker’s backyard shed, with a concrete floor, tin walls and 
inadequate tables or space to operate; and 
• In a garage attached to the outworker’s house. 
23
 
 
The isolation associated with home-based work means it is harder for 
outworkers to discuss their concerns with other employees.
24
 Generally 
fragmented workforces have less cohesion and are less likely to collectivise.
25
 
The New South Wales Minister for Industrial Relations has argued the 
inability of outworkers to collectively bargain meant outworkers required 
additional protection, above and beyond that of ordinary employees.
26
 
 
Research funded by the Queensland Department of Industrial Relations and 
performed by the University of Queensland identified the factors which 
                                                 
21
 [2006] FCA, at (1). 
22
 Michael Webber and Sally Weller, Refashioning the Rag Trade: Internationalising 
Australia's Textiles, Clothing and Footwear Industries (2001) 291. 
23
 Pay Equity Inquiry (1997) NSWIRC 6320: 
<http://www.workandfamily.nsw.gov.au/payequity/report/industries/outworkers.html
> at 11 November 2007  
24
 Asian Women at Work & Vietnamese Women’s Association of NSW, Daring to 
act: A report on the establishment of a Vietnamese women outworkers network 
(2001). 
25
 P Brosnan and L Thornthwaite, ‘The TV work is not so bad: the experience of a 
group of homeworkers’ (1998) 8 Labour & Industry 3, 97-113; Clete Daniel, Culture 
of misfortune: An interpretative history of textile unionism in the United States 
(2001); I Watson, B Buchanan, I Campbell and C Briggs Fragmented futures: New 
challenges in working life (2003).  
26
 New South Wales State Wage Case 2006 (2006) 153 IR 268, at 320. 
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caused outworkers to be so vulnerable to exploitation.
27
 One of the key 
factors identified was the nature of the industry they worked in. The women 
in this research were outworkers at the bottom of supply chains. They were 
deunionised immigrants with limited English and were generally 
economically and culturally vulnerable.  
 
Some legislative reforms have not assisted the plight of outworkers, for 
example, the Commonwealth Senate, Employment, Workplace Relations and 
Education Committee unanimously concluded that outworkers are more 
vulnerable in Australia following the passage of the Independent Contractors 
Act 2006 (Cth).
28
 This act has encouraged the concept that independent 
contractors who are outworkers do not enjoy the protection of industrial 
relations regulations. 
 
 
 C Child labour in outworking 
 
The OHS conditions of outworkers are especially relevant as outworkers’ 
children often work beside their parents. While Scull, Nguyen and Woolcock 
found contradicting evidence to whether children were involved in 
outworking operations or not,
29
 the Commonwealth, New South Wales and 
Victorian reports all concluded children were involved in outworking. The 
Commonwealth Senate Economics References Committee reported on 
outworkers, and concluded: 
 
Evidence shows that children are involved in outworking and the 
Committee concludes that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that 
some children are involved to an unreasonable extent. The 
Committee believes that the situation endured by exploited children 
will only be ameliorated through an improvement in the employment 
conditions experienced by their parents. Having regard to Australia's 
international and national obligations to protect children from 
exploitation, the Committee suggests that Government consideration 
of this matter is warranted.
30
 
                                                 
27
 Sue Scull, My-Linh Nguyen and Geoff Woolcock, above note 3. 
28
 Commonwealth Senate, Employment, Workplace Relations and Education 
Committee, Inquiry into the provisions of the Independent Contractors Bill 2006 and 
Workplace Relations Amendment (Independent Contractors) Bill 2006 (2006), 1.6. 
29
 Sue Scull, My-Linh Nguyen and Geoff Woolcock, above note 3, 31. 
30
 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Senate Economics References 
Committee, Outworkers in the Garment Industry Report (1996) 55. 
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The Commonwealth report recounted a TCFUA case study where an eight 
year old boy was found to be helping his outworker mother to keep up with 
the demand.
31
 The New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission’s Pay 
Equity Inquiry heard evidence of children as young as 12, assisted their 
parent outworkers by performing simple measuring, marking and cutting 
strips needed for the garment, and folding completed garments.
32
 The New 
South Wales briefing paper completed by concluding that one of the most 
undesirable results of outworking was unpaid child labour.
33
 The Victorian 
government concluded the involvement of children in the outworking 
industry is common.
34
 The report provided an example of an 11 year old 
Victorian girl who worked three to five hours on every school day, and all 
day on weekends, ironing of the facings, sewing simple hems and general 
sewing using a sewing machine.
35
 The evidence indicates, while children are 
not involved in every outworking operation, the fact that there is an estimated 
329,000 outworkers in Australia, means even if even if only 1 in every 100 
outworkers recruits their children to assist in their work, then thousands of 
Australian children are involved in outworking. 
 
 
 D OHS concerns in outworking 
 
Generally the working conditions of outworkers are substantially worse than 
outworkers’ factory based counterparts. The most comprehensive research on 
this comparison was performed by Mayhew and Quinlan. Mayhew and 
Quinlan’s research involved both qualitative and quantitative surveys and 
semi-structured interviews with 100 randomly selected factory workers and 
100 non-randomly selected outworkers.
36
 The subjects ranged in age; 
however Mayhew and Quinlan claim several children outworkers were 
prevented from providing responses by their parents. 
 
Mayhew and Quinlan’s research found that the OHS conditions of 
outworkers were considerably worse than outworkers’ factory-based 
                                                 
31
 Ibid, see generally chapter 4. 
32
 Pay Equity Inquiry [1998] NSW IRComm 205. 
33
 Roza Lozusic, above note 13. 
34
 Victorian government, Children at Work? The protection of children engaged in 
work activities: Policy challenges and choices for Victoria Issues Paper (2001) 13-
27. 
35
 Ibid, case study 2. 
36
 Ibid, at 96. 
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counterparts.
37
 Fifty-seven percent of outworkers reported working over ten 
hours per day, while over two percent of factory based workers reported 
working over ten hours per day. No factory based workers reported working 
over twelve hours per day, while forty-seven percent of outworkers reported 
working over twelve hours per day.  
 
The most recent research on outworkers working hours found most subjects 
worked approximately twelve hours per day and sixty-two percent claimed to 
work seven days per week.
38
 
 
Outworking has had a long history in Australia. In the 1860s manufacturers 
outsourced work to outworkers in order to reduce costs and compete with 
competitors.
39
 For over a century the special risks associated with home 
based employment has had recognition.
40
 Traditionally in Australia 
outworkers have been protected under federal awards. Nossa, Johnstone and 
Quinlan noted every industrial award governing the clothing industry, in 
every Australian jurisdiction, since 1919 has attempted to govern the 
protection of home-based outworkers.
41
  
 
To the period ending in 1987, Australian awards prohibited certain conduct 
and prescribed minimal entitlements. Generally these awards were ignored, 
with prohibited conduct being the norm and outworkers consistently 
receiving entitlements, below that of factory based workers. In 1987 awards 
attempted to remedy the continual violations by allowing unions to monitor 
the conduct of outworkers and suppliers, and for outworkers to be entitled to 
remuneration at the same rate of remuneration of factory based workers. 
These amendments were frustrated by the use of separate corporate entities 
and the problems of geographical jurisdiction.
42
 
                                                 
37
 Clair Mayhew and Michael Quinlan, ‘The effects of outsourcing on occupational 
health and safety: A comparative study of factory-based workers and outworkers in 
the Australian clothing industry’ (1999) 29 International Journal of Health.  
38
 Brotherhood of St Laurence, Ethical threads: corporate social responsibility in the 
Australian garment industry (2007) 4. 
39
 Frances, ‘No more amazons: Gender and work process in the Victorian clothing 
trades, 1890-1939’ (1986) 50 Labour History 98. 
40
 A Ballantyne, ‘Homework’ in T Oliver (Ed.) Dangerous Trades: The Historical, 
Social and Legal Aspects of Industrial Occupations as Affecting Health by a Number 
of Experts (1902) 98–103; C Williams, ‘Women and occupational health and safety: 
From narratives of danger to invisibility’ (1983) 73 Labour History 30–52. 
41
 Igor Nossar, Richard Johnstone and Michael Quinlan, above note 2; Re Clothing 
Trades Award (1987) 19 IR 416 at 431-5 per Riordan DP.  
42
 Igor Nossar, Proposals for the Protection of Outworkers from Exploitation (1999.  
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The physical safety of outworkers has been subject to regulation for a 
comparatively short period. While effective business controllers could exert 
substantial economic pressure, due to the corporate veil, the effective 
business controller was not generally liable for the conduct of parties lower in 
the supply chain. The corporate veil provides that each company is a legal 
entity, which is separate from its share holders and related corporate 
entities.
43
 While a company can obviously not take an oath,
44
 appear in court 
on its own behalf
45
 or go to jail,
46
 a company can sue and be sued.
47
 
Companies are generally not liable for the conduct of other companies. 
Parent companies generally use contractual relationships to keep related 
companies at arms length. Where the court finds a related company is in fact 
the agency or trustee of the parent, then the parent can be liable for the other 
company’s conduct.
48
 Companies are only liable where the court finds the 
related company is carrying on business as the parent.
49
 For an agency 
relationship to be established, both the parent company and the other 
company must have indicated the agency relationship, expressly or by 
implication from their words and conduct, exists.
50
 When determining 
whether the other company, is in fact the agent of the parent, the court will 
consider factors such as: 
 
• Do the companies regard the profits of the other company as the 
profits of the parent;
51
 
                                                 
43
 Section 124 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
44
 Tritonia Ltd v Equity and Law Life Assurance Society [1943] 2 All ER 401, 402 
(Viscount Simon LC); Bay Marine Pty Ltd v Clayton Country Properties Pty Ltd 
(1986) 5 ACLC 38, 43 (Samuels JA); Simto Resources Ltd v Normandy Capital Ltd 
(1993) 11 ACLC 856, 861 (French J).  
45
 Fieldhouse v Commissioner of Taxation; sub nom Perron Investments Pty Ltd v 
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 25 FCR 187, 218 (Hill J); MacDonald v 
Australian Securities Commission (No 2) (1994) 12 ACLC 246 (Hill J).  
46
 Pharmaceutical Society v London and Provincial Supply Association Ltd (1880) 5 
App Cas 857 (Lord Blackburn).  
47
 Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] All ER Rep 33.  
48
 Attorney-General v Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd (in Statutory Management) 
[1996] 1 NZLR 528, 539.  
49
 Industrial Equity Ltd v Blackburn (1977) 137 CLR 567 and Re FG (Films) Ltd 
[1953] 1 All ER 615.  
50
 Garnac Grain Co Inc v HMF Faure & Fairclough Ltd & Bunge Corp [1967] 2 All 
ER 353, 358.  
51
 Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1991] 1 All ER 929 (Slade LJ) and Smith Stone and 
Knight Ltd v Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Citizens of the City of Birmingham (1939) 
161 LT 371 (Atkinson J).  
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• Does the parent control the appointment of the board of the other 
company;
52
 
• Does the parent control the day to day operations of the other 
company;
53
 
• Is the parent the only share holder in the other company;
54
 or 
• Are the employees of the other company remunerated by the 
parent?
55
 
 
It would be extremely rare for an effective business controller to create an 
agency relationship with another company to which work is outsourced in a 
supply chain. It is extremely easy for a parent company to structure its 
operation to ensure the corporate veil is not pierced through the establishment 
of an agency relationship.  
 
 
 E OHS protection extended to outworkers 
 
The problems with ensuring outworkers workplaces comply with OHS laws 
are legion. Nossa, Johnstone and Quinlan claim three systematic problems 
with regulations cause OHS not to be regulated for outworkers: 
 
First, there has been an 'entitlement gap' between those workers who 
are formally entitled to the various protective elements of the 
traditional regulatory framework, and those who are not. As 
outworkers are not the employees of suppliers or retailers, 
outworkers have traditionally enjoyed no OHS protection. 
 
Second, even for workers formally protected by the traditional 
regulatory framework, the mechanisms for the enforcement of these 
protections have been inadequate. 
  
Third, an overarching deficiency has been the absence of any 
relevant formal legal obligations upon the major retailers, who 
effectively control the Australian clothing supply chains. This has 
                                                 
52
 Spreag v Paeson Pty Ltd (1990) 94 ALR 679, 711 (Sheppard J).  
53
 DHN Food Distributors Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1976] 1 WLR 
852, 860 (Lord Denning MR) and Spreag v Paeson Pty Ltd (1990) 94 ALR 679, 711 
(Sheppard J).  
54
 DHN Food Distributors Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1976] 1 WLR 
852, 860-862 (Lord Denning MR and Goff LJ respectively).  
55
 Mario Piraino Pty Ltd v Roads Corporation (No 2) [1993] 1 VR 130,148.  
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provided an economic context in which the different parties 
competing further down the supply chains can only survive 
commercially by reducing their costs, most notably the costs of 
complying with formal legal obligations.
56
 
 
This article will judge the OHS outworker reforms using Nossa, Johnstone 
and Quinlan’s criticism of regulatory protection afforded to outworkers. 
 
 
III OHS LEGAL INTERVENTION 
 
 A Imposing duties upon suppliers 
 
The main way in which outworkers are provided OHS protection is through 
deeming provisions. Deeming provisions currently appear in slightly 
different forms in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, 
Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria. Currently Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory do not deem outworkers employees to 
bring them under OHS legislation. These reforms prima facie ensure 
outworkers are entitled to the same OHS protection as standard employees. 
The Australian Capital Territory’s and Victoria’s laws are the only 
jurisdictions which currently expressly link outworkers deeming provisions 
and OHS. A draft bill has been proposed in New South Wales. 
 
The Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Act 2003 (ACT) commenced 
operation on 1 March 2004 and expressly includes workplace protection for 
outworkers. Section 49A of the post reform Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) adopts a 
wide definition of ‘worker’, which includes, inter alia, employees and 
outworkers. Section 49A defines an outworker to mean an ‘individual 
engaged by a person (the principal) under a contract for services to treat or 
manufacture articles or materials, or to perform other services— 
 
 (a) in the outworker’s own home; or 
(b) on other premises not under the control or management of 
the principal.’ 
 
The Outworkers (Improved Protection) Act 2003 (Vic) deems outworkers 
employees for the purposes of statutes, including the Outworkers (Improved 
                                                 
56
 Igor Nossar, Richard Johnstone and Michael Quinlan, above note 2. 
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Protection) Act 2000 (Vic) and the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 
(Vic).
57
 
 
The draft Occupational Health and Safety Amendment Bill 2006 (NSW) 
would have inserted section 27A into the Occupational Health and Safety Act 
2000 (NSW).
58
 Section 27A would have deemed all parties who supply 
outworkers with work to be those outworkers’ employers for the purposes of 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW). Sub-section 27A (2) 
would have enabled deemed employers to totally avoid any OHS duty. Sub-
section 27A(2) would have limited the deemed employers duty to OHS 
obligations, ‘in relation to matters over which the employer [had] control or 
would have control if not for any agreement purporting to limit or remove 
that control.’ Therefore, while the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 
(NSW) would have extended OHS protection to outworkers, this protection 
would have been subject to an agreement between the deemed employer and 
the outworker to the contrary. 
 
New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and South Australia do not 
expressly link OHS and their deeming provisions, rather these jurisdictions 
deem outworkers to be employees of suppliers. Once this deemed 
employment relationship is established suppliers and outworkers are treated 
as employer and employee for the purposes of OHS laws. 
 
The Industrial Relations (Ethical Clothing Trades) Act 2001 (NSW) deemed 
any person, who is not the occupier of a factory, who performs work outside 
a factory involving any work in the clothing trades or the manufacture of 
clothing products, whether directly or indirectly, for the occupier of a factory 
or a trader who sells clothing by wholesale or retail, to be an employee of the 
occupier or trader.
59
 Even though occupiers or traders are not outworker’s 
actual employers, the act deems them to be outworkers’ apparent employers. 
The statutory creation of an apparent employment relationship attracts all the 
legal rights and obligations of a standard employment relationship. 
                                                 
57
 Outworkers (Improved Protection) Act 2003 (Vic) s 4(2).  
58
 Section 21 of the Draft Occupational Health and Safety Amendment Bill 2006 
(NSW); the government has expressed its intention to introduce these amendments 
following a review: New South Wales Legislative Council, Hansard, 4 May 2006, at 
22578 (the Hon. John Della Bosca, Minister for Finance, Minister for Commerce, 
Minister for Industrial Relations, Minister for Ageing, Minister for Disability 
Services, and Vice-President of the Executive Council); As at the time of writing this 
Bill has not been read in Parliament. 
59
 Industrial Relations (Ethical Clothing Trades) Act 2001 (NSW) s 3 refers to) sch 1 
clause 1(f) of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW).  
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When the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) was first enacted, it contained 
outworker protections. The act recognised outworkers could be employees
60
 
and extended the definition to include employees beyond the manufacturing 
industry. Schedule 5 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) defined an 
outworker to include a person who is engaged, for “someone else’s calling or 
business, in or about a private residence or other premises that are not 
necessarily business or commercial premises, to: 
 
(a) pack, process, or work on articles or material; or  
(b) carry out clerical work. 
 
Where an outworker falls within the definition contained in schedule 5, that 
outworker and the deemed employer have all the rights and duties which are 
attracted by a standard employment relationship. 
 
Following reviews in 2000,
61
 the Industrial Relations Act 1984 (Tas) was 
amended, so outworkers were deemed employees the term outworker was 
defined to mean ‘a person who performs for an employer work related to the 
manufacture of a garment outside the employer's premises’.
62
 
 
Amendments to the Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) were modelled on adaptations 
of the New South Wales scheme proposed by Igor Nossa.
63
 The Industrial 
Law Reform (Fair Work) Act 2005 (SA) introduced amendments to the Fair 
Work Act 1994 (SA).
64
 The Industrial Law Reform (Fair Work) Act 2005 
(SA) came into operation on 16 May 2005.
65
 This act defines a contract of 
employment to include the situation where a person contracts work to an 
                                                 
60
 Section 5 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld). 
61
 Parliament of Tasmania Legislative Council Select Committee, Industrial 
Relations Bill 1999 (Tas) Report (2000): 
<http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/ctee/old_ctees/ industrial.pdf> at 13 November 
2007. 
62
 Section 3 of the Industrial Relations Act 1984 (Tas). 
63
 Igor Nossar, Proposals for Protection of Outworkers in South Australia (2002). 
64
 Pt 2 of the Industrial Law Reform (Fair Work) Act 2005 (SA).  
65
 Industrial Law Reform (Fair Work) Act 2005 (SA). For an explanation of the 
import of this amendment generally see Erin McCarthy, Elizabeth Priest and Andrew 
Stewart, ‘Fair Work Arrives in South Australia! But will it Really Make a 
Difference?’ (2005) 18 Australian Journal of Labour Law 292.  
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outworker.
66
 The Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) defines an outworker to include a 
person: 
 
(a) who is engaged, for the purposes of the trade or business of 
another (the employer) to — 
(i) work on, process, clean or pack articles or materials 
… 
 
Through being deemed an employee, an outworker can surmount one of the 
largest difficulties in outworker regulation: being regarded as a self-employed 
contractor rather than an employee.
67
 Once the outworker is deemed an 
employee, then they are protected by the extensive OHS regime and the 
deemed employers are subject to OHS duties as employers. 
 
 
 B Extended deeming provisions 
 
Due to the power of retailers, Nossa, Johnstone and Quinlan claim outworker 
regulation should place obligations upon retailers. As suppliers are the parties 
with the most contact with outworkers, this article has elected to analyse if 
OHS duties can be imposed over suppliers. On the basis suppliers do have 
OHS duties to ensure outworkers safety, this article will explore how these 
OHS laws are being enforced. If these laws are not enforced, this article will 
then discuss an alternative regulatory enforcement v and those OHS duties  
Even though this part is not focusing upon duties imposed over retailers for 
outworkers safety, it is important to note here the Australian Capital Territory 
has expressly extended duties up to the top of supply chains for the safety of 
outworkers. The Australian Capital Territory is the only jurisdiction to 
expressly impose OHS duties up the supply chain. Employers’ liability under 
the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) is very wide. Pursuant to the definition of 
employer in section 49A, employers are not only liable for outworkers they 
employ directly, but they are also liable for outworkers where an ‘agent of 
the person engages the worker as a worker of the agent’. This means, where a 
corporation outsources the manufacturing of work to a unrelated corporation, 
and that unrelated corporation hires outworkers, both corporations will be 
liable for the OHS conditions of the outworker, within the scope of the 
                                                 
66
 S 4(d) of the Fair Work Act 1994 (SA); for an example of where this provision was 
used to deem a taxi driver as an employee see: Waite v Des's Cabs Pty Ltd [1995] 
SAIRComm 157. 
67
 Jane Tassie, ‘Home based workers at risk: Outworkers and occupational health and 
safety’ (1997) 25 Pergamon Safety Science 3, 179-186. 
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Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). Under section 49B, both corporations can be liable 
under the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), where the danger to the outworker arises 
from: 
 
 (a) an act of the employer; or 
 (b) anything in the employer’s possession or control; … 
 
 
IV IS OUTWORKERS’ OHS PROTECTION ENFORCED? 
 
Nossa, Johnstone and Quinlan observed the extension of regulatory 
protection to outworkers must be enforced to have any effect. On this point 
the current OHS reforms fail outworkers dismally. As deemed employees of 
suppliers, outworkers should receive the same OHS protection as employees 
who are working away from their employers’ premises. As the below 
analysis demonstrates, despite having OHS obligations imposed upon them, 
suppliers are not ensuring their outworkers’ safety. On the basis of a search 
of all industrial cases in Australia cannot find a reported or unreported case, 
where in a supplier has been convicted for an OHS breach against 
outworkers, this article concludes OHS protections for outworkers is not 
being enforced. 
 
 
 A How suppliers could perform risk assessments 
 
As supplier deemed employers largely have the power to dictate terms to 
outworkers, it is reasonable to presume supplier deemed employers have the 
capacity to ensure they have the control to perform risk assessments. One of 
the main ways in which OHS duties are discharged is through process based 
risk management. Process risk management broadly consists of three steps of 
hazard identification, risk assessment and risk control.
68
 If a supplier is 
deemed to be the employer of an outworker, then they will be required as an 
employer to perform risks assessments.
69
 Risk assessments are essential, as 
without a risk assessment, employers would not be cognisant of all the risks 
which face their employees.
70
 Deemed employers cannot successfully take 
                                                 
68
 Chris Maxwell, Occupational Health and Safety Act Review (2004) State of 
Victoria, at 694. 
69
 Richard Johnstone, Occupational health and safety law and policy (2
nd
 ed, 2004) 
25-27. 
70
 Michael Tooma, Tooma's annotated Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 
(2005) 99-100 and 108. 
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steps to manage a risk, until the deemed employer has identified the risk 
exist.  
 
The requirement to perform risk assessment is not expressly prescribed in 
every jurisdiction’s OHS statute. In Queensland, New South Wales, South 
Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia OHS laws expressly require 
employers to perform risk assessments. For example: 
  
In Queensland, for an employer to properly manage exposure to risks 
to their employees, the employer must identify all hazards, assess the 
risks that may result because of the hazards and decide on 
appropriate control measures to prevent, or minimise the level of, the 
risks.
71
 
 
In New South Wales, an employer is required to perform a risk assessment 
where the old risk assessment is no longer current, or when ever there is a 
change to work systems to which the old risk assessment relates.
72
 
 
Similar obligations appear in South Australia,
73
 Tasmania
74
 and Western 
Australia.
75
 In those jurisdictions which do not expressly require employers 
to perform risks assessments, OHS laws imply this duty. For example, 
section 20 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) requires 
parties to eliminate “risks to health and safety so far as is reasonably 
practicable”
76
, or ”reduce those risks so far as is reasonably practicable”
77
. In 
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 Section 27A of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (QLD). 
72
 Clause 12 of the Occupational Health and Safety Regulations 2001 (NSW). 
73
 Regulation 1.3.3 of the Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Regulations 1995 
(SA). 
74
 Regulations 5 and 18 of the Workplace Health and Safety Regulations 1998 (Tas). 
75
 Regulations 3.1 of the Occupational Safety and Health Regulations 1996 (WA). 
76
 Section 20(1) (a) Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic); while Victoria 
does not expressly include risk assessments in the general OHS statute, risk 
assessments are expressly required in certain aspects of the employment relationship. 
For example with the risk of falls: Section 203 of the Occupational Health and Safety 
(Prevention of Falls) Regulations 2003 (Vic); with the risk of asbestos: Section 202 
of the Occupational Health and Safety (Asbestos) Regulations 2003 (Vic); where 
employees are manually handling hazardous materials: section 7 of the Occupational 
Health and Safety (Manual Handling) Regulations 1999 (Vic); where employees are 
exposed to lead: section 210 of the Occupational Health and Safety (Lead) 
Regulations 2000 (Vic); where employees work in confined spaces: Section 13 of the 
Occupational Health and Safety (Confined Spaces) Regulations 1996 (Vic). 
77
 Paragraph 20(1) (b) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic). 
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determining what is “reasonably practicable”, section 20(2) presumes parties 
are aware of all risks which it is determined the party “ought reasonably to 
know” about
78
. In effect, this presumption compels parties to take active steps 
to ensure they are aware of safety risks in the workplace.
79
 A party, who fails 
to take such proactive steps, may be assumed to be aware of an OHS risk and 
be liable to a more substantial punishment due to their failure to manage the 
risk. Bottomley argues, “(h)azards may be classified into various types such 
as physical, chemical, environmental.
80
 Employers cannot merely react to 
injuries or risks once they are manifested.
81
 Employers must actively identify 
all risks. 
 
Even if suppliers have the contractual power to perform risk assessments, are 
they in a position to perform risk assessments? The proactive OHS duty 
requires continual vigilance from employers to identify possible risks. These 
risks can be created by the system of work or by the inadvertence of 
employees.
82
 Hill J explained in WorkCover Authority (NSW) v Atco Controls 
Pty Ltd: 
  
Employers are obligated to take “abundant caution, maintain constant 
vigilance and take all practicable precautions to ensure safety in the 
workplace. It is essential that the approach be a proactive and not re-
active one; employers should be on the offensive to search for, detect 
and eliminate, so far as is reasonably practicable, any possible areas 
of risk to safety, health and welfare which may exist or occur from 
time to time in the workplace.
83
 
 
Unlike standard employers, supplier deemed employers are not on the same 
premises as the outworkers. Does this prevent suppliers from being able to 
maintain constant vigilance?  
 
The proactive OHS duty is not contingent upon the employer’s ability to 
micromanage the employee. The proactive OHS duty arises due to the 
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 Paragraph 20(2) (c) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic). 
79
 See Chris Maxwell, above note 71, at 108-110. 
80
 Bottomley, B. “Risk assessments: less ritual and more reliability” paper presented 
to Safety in Action Conference 2006. 
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 WorkCover Authority (Insp Egan) v Atco Controls Pty Ltd (1998) 82 IR 80. 
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 Brooker v Foreman Pty Ltd (2006) QIC 54; Paparella v Lexaid Pty Ltd (2006) 
SAIRC 23, at (31) and (32); Parker v Q-Comp (2007) QIC 25; Workcover Authority 
of NSW v Main Lighting Pty Ltd (1995) 200 IR 248, at 257. 
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general OHS duty. Where the employer permits the employee to work 
without close supervision, the employer must ensure the employee has 
adequate training and instructions to adequately assess the risks. The task can 
be delegated, but not the duty.
84
 For example, in Short v Lockshire Pty Ltd 
the injured employee was using a grinder to cut the baffles out of a stainless 
steel tank
85
. The employee was wearing protective clothing. A fellow 
employee came to assist the injured employee. This employee did not wear 
the required safety gear. 
 
During the work the employees altered the cutting disc. The altered disc 
would not operate effectively on the grinder with the safety guard on. 
Consequently the employees removed the guard and continued grinding.  
 
The disc shattered and fragments lodged in an employee’s cranium causing 
death. 
 
There was an Advisory Standard Code of Practice which dictated what the 
system of work required. The employer did not attempt to suggest they had 
complied with the code. On the contrary, the employer argued they had 
adopted an equally safe method of performing the work. President Hall 
observed the code required the employer to perform an assessment of the 
risks of performing the work. The employer’s system of work delegated the 
assessment of risks to the employee. 
 
President Hall held that the code was directed at avoiding “misuse of 
equipment, employee laxity and neglect by an employee” of their own safety.  
When fellow employees were asked, they readily identified alternative safer 
approaches of completing the task which ultimately was fatal for the injured 
employee. The employer had no system of instructing employees of how 
work should be performed safely and did not perform spot cheques to ensure 
work was being conducted safely. 
 
Supplier deemed employers are often in a position to perform a risk 
assessment. The proactive duty requires employers to take into consideration 
the subjective factors of all the surrounding circumstances of the workplace.
86
 
                                                 
84
 WorkCover Authority (Insp Glass) v Kellogg (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 1) (1999) 101 IR 
239 at 257. 
85
 Short v Lockshire [2000] QIC 62. 
86
 Mainbrace Constructions Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority (Insp Charles) [2000] 
NSWIRComm 239; WorkCover Authority (Insp Robinson) v Milltech Pty Ltd [2001] 
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The proactive duty requires employers to do more than just identify risks 
which are obvious or which warning signals have identified.
87
 While the 
proactive duty imposes a broad duty upon employers, this duty is not 
absolute. Employers are not expected to identify risks which are unable to be 
identified. Generally the High Court of Australia has held a person should 
only be liable for failing in their proactive duty where the risks are real or 
appreciable, and not merely speculative.
88
 A similar approach is taken in 
OHS. Employers will not be liable for risks which are ‘impossible to 
anticipate’ or are ‘entirely speculative’ in nature.
89
 Establishing a risk was not 
foreseeable or is speculative is extremely difficult. In almost all cases a risk 
to health will be foreseeable. For example, in WorkCover Authority of New 
South Wales (Inspector Childs) v Stimson (No 2) a trench in the ground was 
becoming unsafe.
90
 The employer directed the employee to keep away from 
the area, but did not enforce their direction. The employee re-entered the 
trench and the trench collapsed. Staff J held the employer should have 
foreseen the possibility that the employee would ignore the employer’s 
direction, and therefore should have erected a fence or barricade to prevent 
access.
91
 
 
In relation to employers’ proactive OHS duty in relation to hidden risks at 
work, Bolan J explained: 
 
The obligation on the employer is to actively seek out all risks to 
safety and eliminate them. It is not obvious or foreseeable risks that 
must be eliminated but also those that often occur in workplaces, the 
unforeseen or hidden risk. In this case a visual inspection of the work 
was not sufficient. What [the employer] should have done is ask 
themselves whether there was even the remotest possibility the 
planks might shift and put persons at risk. This would have 
necessitated a much closer consideration of the potential risks, the 
                                                                                                                    
NSWIRComm 51 and Kennedy-Taylor (NSW) Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority (Insp 
Charles) (2000) 102 IR 57,  
Ferguson v Nelmac Pty Limited (1999) 92 IR 188. 
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detriment to safety would have become evident and appropriate 
action could have been taken to eliminate the risk.
92
 
 
The proactive duty upon supplier deemed employers could easily identify 
many of the major OHS risks faced by outworkers.  
 
For employers, the duty to assess the risks always remains the duty of the 
employer and not that of the employee
93
. The responsibility to conduct a risk 
assessment cannot be informally delegated to employees. The onus remains 
the employers at all times. Marks J explained the duty to create a safe system 
of work remained the duty of the employer. The employer’s OHS duty 
required them to ensure’ {a} All tasks must be assessed to ensure the system 
of work allows no risk of injury ... It is not sufficient for … the employer to 
leave the responsibility for carrying out this task safely to be assessed by 
workers carrying out the task on the spot.’
94
 If the employees do not ‘exercise 
the necessary foresight and vigilance to avoid any undue risk to the health 
and safety’, then the employer will be liable.
95
 
 
 
B Do suppliers deemed employers perform risk 
assessments? 
 
There does not to appear to be any evidence that suggests suppliers perform 
OHS audits of outworker’s workplaces, even though they are often physically 
able to perform such inspections. The Brotherhood of St Laurence found 
most retailers and suppliers did not have a process in place to monitor labour 
conditions in factories lower in the supply chain.
96
 They found, out of 
nineteen retailers, only two had ever met an outworker or visited an 
outworkers place of work.
97
 The nature of outworking is that the supplier will 
deliver and collect products from the outworker’s domestic residence, which 
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 Inspector Green v The Crown in the Right of the State of NSW (Department of 
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generally is also their place of work.
98
 In other words, the supplier is 
physically in the proximity of the outworker’s place of work before every 
clothing order is commenced. This does not mean the supplier goes past the 
front door and inspects outworkers’ work stations. In Ngo and Commissioner 
of Taxation the supplier provided in evidence that he had visited the 
outworker’s home at least one hundred times.
99
 The supplier claimed he had 
no idea how the outworker could have performed the work within the time 
frames, especially considering the outworkers ‘poor health’. The supplier 
stated: 
 
She took so much work that I don't think it was possible for her to 
have personally done all the work.
100
 
 
The Senate report concluded; while some suppliers complied with labour 
conditions, other suppliers actively sort to avoid compliance.
101
 Scull, 
Nguyen and Woolcock reported outworkers claimed no one was concerned 
for their working conditions or OHS.
102
 Scull found suppliers did not regard 
outworkers’ OHS as their concern.
103
 One supplier stated: 
  
No-one wants to come to work in a factory. In the factory, employees 
are covered by WorkCover, but everything is kept safe, and OHS 
practice is followed. … How can I be responsible for people working 
at home? I can’t go and tell people what to do in their own home. 
Everyone working at home should be a contractor, and have to be 
registered as a business, which they have already as they have ABNs. 
 
Rather than demonstrating concern for outworkers labour conditions, 
suppliers are reported to use aggressive tactics to force outworkers to perform 
work on unfavourable labour conditions. Mayhew and Quinlan report 
outworkers work in a violent industry.
104
 In other research, Mayhew and 
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Quinlan claimed 49% of outworkers in their research reported verbal abuse, 
23% reported threats, while 7% reported being subject to physical 
violence.
105
  
 
 
C How suppliers deemed employers could ensure a 
safe system of work 
 
Despite the geographical separation, supplier deemed employers could take 
steps to manage the system of work. Supplier deemed employers could use 
the results of a risk assessment to ensure the outworkers use sewing machines 
which have correct guards, ensure the workplace has sufficient lighting, the 
workplace is adequately ventilated, and children do not have access to the 
work area and other such general safety risks. Through taking inexpensive 
steps, suppliers can make outworkers’ workplaces safer. Williams analysed 
how employers can make workplaces safer.
106
 Through providing 
comfortable safety equipment and information, employers can substantially 
increase the level of safety at workplaces. Similar to employers, if suppliers 
ensured outworkers had guards on their machines, ergonomically sound work 
stations
107
 or provided them advice on safe lighting, ventilation,
108
 protective 
                                                                                                                    
Occupations’ in Kerstin Isaksson, Töres Theorell , Christer Hogstedt, Charli Eriksson 
and Töres Theorell (eds.), Health Effects of the New Labour Market (2002) 183. 
105
 Clair Mayhew and Michael Quinlan, ‘The Effects of Outsourcing on Occupational 
Health and Safety: A Comparative Study of Factory-Based Workers and Outworkers 
in the Australian Clothing Industry’ (1999) 29 International Journal of Heath.  
106
 Warwick Williams Barriers to occupational noise management, PhD Thesis, 
University of New South Wales, 2007.  
107
 D Kisilak, D Golob and S Franc, ‘Using the ergonomic principles in workplace 
design in clothing production’ (2007) 47 Sigurnost 2, 117-123; J Nasel Saraji, S 
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clothing
109
 and noise,
110
 then suppliers would presumably improve 
outworker’s safety at work. 
 
The importance of employers ensuring a safe system of work is emphasised 
by the strict approach taken to this duty by the courts. For example, In 
Paparella v Kerry Logistics (Australia) Pty Ltd the employer had recently 
purchased a business which had OHS risks.
111
 The employer had instructed 
the employees of the potential risks and relied upon employees’ common 
sense not to suffer injuries. The employer had a program to remedy all the 
breaches. An employee was injured before one of the OHS risk could be 
remedied. The employer was convicted and fined. 
  
Employers must ensure all the equipment in the workplace is safe and 
complies with regulations. In Inspector Sequeira v Kodak (Australasia) Pty 
Ltd the employer required employees to use a non-powered guillotine. The 
non-powered guillotine had been imported from Germany and did not strictly 
comply with Australian standards. An employee was injured on the machine. 
The employer had operated in Australia for over one hundred years without 
an OHS conviction. The employer was convicted and fined. 
D Do suppliers deemed employers manage their 
outworkers’ system of work? 
 
Research indicates, despite outworkers working in dangerous working 
systems, suppliers do not seek to manage the OHS risks faced by outworkers. 
The research found a large number of OHS concerns with outworkers work 
stations and with the inadequacy of safety equipment, for example: 
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• The Commonwealth Senate Economic References Committee, 
Chang, Asian Women at Work and the New South Wales Pay Equity 
Review found outworkers work at work stations which are poorly 
lighted.
112
 Scull, Nguyen found most outworkers surveyed attempted 
to install adequate lighting, however as outworkers had no training 
on what levels of lighting is necessary, the research concluded 
outworkers opinions on the adequacy of their lighting did not mean 
such lighting would satisfy OHS laws.
113
 
• The Commonwealth Senate Economic References Committee found 
some outworkers’ work stations were excessively noisy.
114
 
• The Commonwealth Senate Economic References Committee and 
the New South Wales Pay Equity Review found outworkers work 
stations were not ergonomically designed were cramped and had 
inadequate space for outworkers to discharge their duties.
115
 
• Chang found outworkers work stations had inadequate climate 
control which were sufficiently extreme to create an OHS concern.
116
 
 
Research has also indicated outworkers have inadequate equipment to 
perform their tasks safely. For example: 
 
• The New South Wales Pay Equity Review Found outworkers were 
forced to lift heavy boxes without mechanical or human assistance.
117
 
• Chang found outworkers involved with preparing products for sale 
wore inadequate protective clothing, and thus outworkers were 
exposed to bleaches and dyes.
118
 As a consequence many outworkers 
suffered from skin conditions, such as dermatitis as a result of their 
outworking.  
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• Hepworth found outworkers worked on poorly installed industrial 
machines using inadequate domestic power sources.
119
 
 
Research indicates suppliers continue to allow their outworkers and their 
outworkers’ children to operate in dangerous work environments. The above 
research did not indicate suppliers took any steps to redress the risks to their 
outworkers’ health and safety.  
 
 
1 How suppliers deemed employers could provide 
training 
 
Arguably the easiest aspect of OHS for suppliers to manage is outworkers’ 
level of training. While it may be difficult for suppliers to manage their 
outworker’s daily OHS risks, it is relatively easy for supplier to identify the 
areas in which outworkers would require training to be able to perform their 
tasks safely. While outworkers may elect not to follow the training, suppliers 
can easily control the amount of training outworkers receive. 
 
All OHS acts require employers to provide their employees sufficient training 
to ensure their employees are able to work safely.
120
 Employers cannot just 
rely upon their employees common sense. In WorkCover Authority of New 
South Wales (Inspector Mayell) v Claude Van Den Bruggen t/as Dolphin 
Antenna Service a self-employed employer recruited an employee to assist 
with the installation of television antennas.
121
 The employee was a carpenter 
by trade and had received a one day training course on installing antennas. 
The employer permitted the employee a wide discretion in the discharge of 
his work. The reliance of the employee’s ‘common sense’ and the failure to 
supervise, led to the employee allowing a television cable he was holding to 
come in contact with electricity, causing the employees fatal wounding.
122
 
Staunton J found the employer was not entitled to rely upon their employee’s 
                                                 
119
A Hepworth,‘Pink collar sweat shops’ Refractory Girl (1994), Australia Women’s 
Studies Journal, at 54-57. 
120
 Section 37 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1989 (ACT); Section 
16(2)(e) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (CTH); section 29 of the 
Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (QLD); section 8 of the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act 2000 (NSW);section 19 of the Occupational Health, Safety and 
Welfare Act 1986 (SA); section 9 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 
(Tas); section 21 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic); Paragraph 
19(1)(b) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA). 
121
 [2007] NSWIRComm 193. 
122
 [2007] NSWIRComm 193, at (38) and (39). 
        DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                               VOLUME 12 NO 2 68
common sense and limited training to conduct a risk assessment, and the 
OHS duty remained that of the employer. As the employer did not discharge 
their OHS duty they were guilty.
123
 
 
Even where the activity is obviously dangerous, in most cases, if the 
employer has failed to train the employee, the employer will be liable. In 
Paul Bradley Waltham and Cairns Synergy Electrical Pty Ltd the employee 
demonstrated a lack of common sense by walking on dangerously fragile and 
unsupported roofing.
124
 Regardless of the employees conduct, the employer 
had not provided the employee training or adequate supervision. Hall P 
noted, the duty of employers, is to ensure their employees OHS. Employers’ 
‘obligation is not discharged by engaging experienced staff and trusting them 
to care for themselves.’
125
 Even though the employee was found to be 
blameworthy, as the employer had failed in their OHS duty, the 
blameworthiness of the employee was immaterial to the guilt of the 
employer.
126
 As the employer did not provide training or adequate 
supervision, the employer was liable. 
 
In general, these OHS obligations require employers to instruct employees of 
all OHS risks associated with their duties.
127
 Employees in the manufacturing 
industry would require training in, inter alia, in the correct use of machines 
and of lifting materials. For example, in Inspector Hopkins v Byron McIntyre 
D & R Henderson Pty Ltd an employer had not instructed the employee in the 
correct way to make alterations to the machine.
128
 The employee was 
adjusting a machine with an automatic cutting device. Due to the incorrect 
approach his finger was amputated. The employer had argued they had in 
place a guard and was unaware employees had breached its policy by 
removing it. The employer was convicted. 
 
Where the employee’s duty requires them to lift heavy materials or lift items 
in strange circumstances, employers must train their employees. In Inspector 
Legge v Timminco Pty Ltd the employee was required to lift a basket in and 
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out of a washing machine.
129
 The basket weighed approximately thirty 
kilograms. The employer had provided the employee no instruction on the 
correct lifting technique. The employee suffered a back injury. The employee 
pleaded guilty and was fined. 
 
 
E Do suppliers deemed provide outworkers with 
training? 
 
Research indicates suppliers often do not provide outworkers sufficient 
training. Most participating outworkers in a New South Wales report alleged 
they had no initial or ongoing training.
130
 Scull, Nguyen and Woolcock found 
it was common for outworkers in Queensland to teach themselves how to 
perform their duties or to learn from their relatives.
131
 Suppliers provided no 
training for outworkers. 
 
 
V ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY MODEL – EXTENDING 
SUPPLY CHAIN REGULATION 
 
The current regulatory model has provided outworkers a prima facie 
entitlement to OHS protection, however this regulatory framework has failed 
to deliver substantive results. In summary, the current regulatory framework 
has failed to deliver improvements in outworkers labour conditions. The 
Brotherhood of St Laurence report noted that ‘[o]utworkers interviewed for 
this research indicated that conditions had worsened in the last five years’.
132
 
Rather than attempting to amend the existing OHS laws to improve their 
coverage, this article supports the Nossa, Johnstone and Quinlan’s argument 
that existing supply chain regulation should be extended to expressly include 
OHS. This idea was first posed by Nossa, Johnstone and Quinlan before 
either the New South Wales or South Australian codes were drafted and 
introduced.
133
 This article will now examine the terms of the existing supply 
chain codes and demonstrate how outworkers’ OHS protection could be 
extended using these codes. 
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There are currently two Australian based mandatory retail codes - one in New 
South Wales and another in South Australia. The New South Wales Ethical 
Clothing Trades Extended Responsibility Scheme was made under Part 3 of 
the Industrial Relations (Ethical Clothing Trades) Act 2001 (NSW), and the 
South Australian Outworker (Clothing Industry) Protection Code was made 
under section 99C of the Fair Work Act 1994 (SA).
134
 Where voluntary 
corporate codes have not been widely adopted in Australia, the New South 
Wales and the South Australian codes surmount this limitation by imposing 
mandatory obligations. As a result, all retailers and suppliers subject to the 
codes must comply with the codes’ provisions.
135
 
 
Clauses 15 of the New South Wales and South Australian codes requires 
suppliers to state if any of their goods were produced within Australia. If 
products were produced within Australia, then Schedule 2 - Part B of the 
code requires the supplier to inform retailers to whom they supply those 
goods, of the address where the actual work will be performed. If the work is 
to be performed in a factory, the supplier must provide details of the factory’s 
registration under relevant OHS regulations. 
 
It would be relatively easy to extend the requirements under the codes’ 
schedules to include OHS. The New South Wales and South Australian codes 
seek to ensure outworkers receive their lawful entitlements under all relevant 
awards,
136
 remuneration and ‘other lawful entitlements to outworkers in the 
clothing trades’ industry.
137
 James, Johnstone and Quinlan have argued ‘other 
legal entitlements’ include OHS.
138
 Even if OHS is included within the codes, 
the existing disclosure requirements under the codes will not protect 
outworkers’ OHS. Currently the only express protection in relation to OHS is 
a duty to keep records where all work is performed and the factory 
registration number under relevant OHS regulations.
139
 Given that the codes 
already aim to protect all labour conditions, it would be feasible to improve 
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outworkers’ workplace safety. As explored above, OHS duties require parties 
to perform risk assessments, ensure a safe system and ensure employees have 
adequate training to enable them to work safely. All of these duties require 
documentation. Given that the codes already require details to demonstrate 
remuneration and other award entitlements are met, the imposition of the 
obligation to provide copies of safety documentation would not be unduly 
onerous. As explored above, various Parliaments have imposed OHS laws 
upon suppliers for outworkers OHS. This requires suppliers to generate OHS 
related documentation. If the codes required suppliers to provide copies of 
OHS documentation concerning outworkers, then this would not be imposing 
OHS duties upon suppliers, but merely requiring suppliers to photocopy 
documentation which they should have generated already under OHS laws. 
Requiring suppliers to photocopy existing documentation would not appear 
to be an onerous obligation, when the provision of such information could 
assist in protecting outworkers’ right to health and safety at work. 
 
The codes rely primarily on private enforcement to ensure suppliers comply 
with the codes.
140
 Clause 13 of both codes requires retailers to obtain the 
information from Schedule 2 from suppliers. While the codes do not impose 
any obligations upon retailers or suppliers to proactively ensure the codes are 
complied with, the codes do prevent parties from wilfully shutting their eyes 
to breaches. Clause 11 of the codes requires retailers to report any violation 
they are aware of or where the retailer: 
 
(b) has knowledge based on previous dealings or commercial 
arrangements with or through a relevant person; or  
(c) has information arising from an inspection of premises where 
work is or has been performed by outworkers, that would lead a 
reasonable person in the position of the retailer to be so aware that 
the outworkers have been, or will be, employed on less favourable 
terms and conditions than that prescribed under the relevant award or 
other relevant industrial instrument.
141
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Retailers and suppliers are entitled to rely upon assertions made by suppliers 
outside the jurisdiction. Clauses 8(2)(b) of the codes, enable a party to avoid 
liability if they have reasonably relied on information supplied by another 
person. The enforcement of the codes therefore depends on each party being 
honest about labour conditions at their workplace, parties keeping records 
and parties not wilfully shutting their eyes to breaches. As supply chains 
generally consist of various independent parties, it is probable a breach of the 
codes will be identified by at least one party. The problem with this approach 
is that people in the industry who most need auditing, are likely not to 
complain about breaches of the codes and thus the worst offenders may avoid 
detection. 
 
Where a labour breach is not reported by outworkers, suppliers or retailers, 
then unions and public inspectors are charged with identifying prosecuting 
breaches. Sub-clause 8(3) of the codes enables an authorized member of the 
Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia or a government inspector 
to prosecute a breach of the codes, subject to the operation of sections 15 and 
399 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) and section 235 of the Fair 
Work Act 1994 (SA) respectively. When Australian regulatory authorities 
have sufficient evidence on OHS breaches it is highly probable that those 
authorities will take enforcement action. The ability of unions to prosecute 
arguably increases outworkers’ OHS protection. The New South Wales 
Workcover recommended the continuation of union prosecutions for OHS 
breaches, on the basis that unions have been successfully been prosecuting 
such breaches in New South Wales for over sixty years.
142
 Braithwaite,
143
 
Gunningham and Johnstone have argued, the ability of unions to prosecute 
where regulators fail to prosecute, increases the level of OHS enforcement.
144
 
Presuming public authorities and/or unions ill enforce outworkers rights once 
they have evidence of a breach, how are code breaches identified? 
 
Breaches under the codes are not contingent entirely upon outworkers 
complaining about labour violations. Clause 20 of both codes enables public 
authorities and authorized officials of the TCFUA to require retailers to 
produce copies of all records required to be kept under the codes. The South 
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Australian code requires retailers keep these records for seven years and the 
New South Wales code requires retailers keep these records for six years. The 
codes enable the authorised person or the TCFUA to specify the geographical 
location where the records must be made available. To avoid problems with 
the retailers operations, the codes provides that the notice cannot require the 
records to be produced on the retailer’s premises. This notice to produce 
records does not need to be associated with a complaint or breach. Clause 
20(1) of both codes enables an authorised person to provide the notice either 
following a complaint or as part of routine investigations. This means a civil 
servant or union official can perform routine investigations into a retailer who 
they suspect of breaching the codes.  
 
The capacity of government and unions to perform routine investigations 
increases the potential of detecting breaches. Retailers know they could be 
randomly identified for investigation and that such investigations are not 
subject to a complaint.  
 
Where a retailer or supplier is proven to have breached the codes, then they 
will be subject to legal and commercial sanctions. Clauses 7(2) of the codes 
enable a party who has breached the code to be subject to a fine.  
 
In addition to the direct impact of legal sanctions, if a supplier is fined for 
breaching the codes, then suppliers and retailers maybe reluctant to trade with 
that party, as once a supplier was convicted, there would be a commercial 
history of the party breaching the code provisions. In such circumstances, it 
would be questionable whether the retailer or supplier could reasonably rely 
upon the convicted suppliers’ representations in relation to OHS. If retailers 
and suppliers cannot reasonably rely upon suppliers’ representations, then the 
retailer or supplier increases the probability of direct liability for any breach 
of the codes. As a consequence, a sanction under the codes could result in a 
fine or a loss of business.  
 
In addition to the threat from direct legal sanctions, if a supplier has been 
fined for breaching the codes, the existence of corporate social responsibility 
would pressure parties not to trade with the person who has been breached. 
While attracting legal sanctions under the codes may not justify blacklisting 
by retailers and suppliers, corporate social responsibility focuses on the 
image or perception of the target group.
145
 This means, if a target group is 
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likely to perceive a supplier as unethical, then retailers and suppliers may 
blacklist the convicted supplier simply to avoid any negative taint. 
 
Unlike existing OHS protection afforded to outworkers, expanding the 
existing New South Wales and South Australian codes to include OHS would 
substantially address Nossa, Johnstone and Quinlan’s three concerns with 
existing outworker OHS protection.  
 
By expressly including outworkers OHS protection under the codes, 
outworkers would be further ensured prima facie entitlement to OHS 
protection similar to standard employees. Where existing OHS protection for 
outworkers adopts the traditional OHS enforcement model, the New South 
Wales and South Australian codes adopt proactive disclosure requirements, 
which forces parties throughout the supply chain to keep records of 
outworkers supposed conditions. Furthermore, where the existing OHS 
regulation largely ignores the retailer’s role in supply chains, the New South 
Wales and South Australian codes impose limited duties upon retailers. The 
codes do not impose OHS obligations upon retailers, rather the codes impose 
limited obligations upon retailers to assist in the protection of outworkers.  
 
While the expansion of the existing retail codes to include OHS would likely 
improve the OHS conditions of outworkers, this option is not perfect. For 
example, inspections under the codes focus on disclosure of documents and 
not social audits of actual workplaces. As a remedial vehicle, requiring 
disclosure of documents is considerably less intrusive for businesses, 
however relying entirely upon documentary evidence will fail to identify 
unethical businesses who are prepared to fraudulently alter documents.
146
 
Where an unscrupulous supplier has simply kept no documentary evidence, 
the complications in legally confirming a breach creates practical 
opportunities for regulatory avoidance. Where an unscrupulous supplier or 
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retailer attempted to avoid the codes, then, on the basis outworkers are 
unlikely to complain, the enforcement of the codes would require government 
or unions to identify a person who may be breaching the codes and to inspect 
their records. Parties who are unscrupulous and are profiting from breaching 
the codes can be difficult to enforce orders against. For example, if a supplier 
has an inspection notice served upon them and they ignore it, then the 
supplier could be fined and ordered by the relevant Industrial Relations 
Commission to comply with the order. Due to the transient nature of the 
outworking industry the supplier may simply disappear with all their records. 
(Nossa, Johnstone and Quinlan claim that middle men corporations often 
disappear before a judgment can be enforced.)
147
 Weller claims suppliers 
often go into liquidation to avoid proceedings and then re-enter the industry 
with a new corporate name.
148
 The practice of suppliers entering liquidation 
to avoid prosecutions appears common. For example, in Textile Clothing 
Footwear Union of Australia v Southern Cross Clothing Pty Ltd the supplier 
ignored a court order to file a defence and instructed their solicitor to inform 
the court they were considering entering into liquidation.
149
  
 
Under the current arrangement, unscrupulous suppliers and retailers know 
when they receive an inspection notice that they have a window of 
opportunity to commence to wind up their operations and transfer their 
business to an alternative legal entity. On the other hand, those attempting to 
enforce the code cannot act against the unscrupulous supplier or retailer until 
the inspection order is breached and they have a court order. Even though 
these codes are not perfect, the fact remains they are operational regulatory 
models which can be adapted quickly to provide increased protection for the 
most vulnerable members in Australian supply chains. When considering 
vehicles to encourage corporations to act respect human rights, Ruggie 
observed there is ‘no single silver bullet’ that will resolve the business and 
human rights challenge.
150
 This article contends that, while extending the 
codes may not provide the best option, it is a ‘vehicle’ which has been 
accepted by two state governments and appears to be providing benefits in 
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other labour conditions and affords a vehicle through which outworkers’ 
workplace safety could be improved.
151
 
 
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
Regulation has struggled to ensure outworkers’ safety at work. As explored 
in the first part of this article, outworkers are generally the most vulnerable 
members of clothing manufacturing supply chains. Outworkers are 
vulnerable as they work from their domestic residence, are de-unionised and 
are culturally isolated from standard enforcement agencies. Nossa, Johnstone 
and Quinlan identified three systematic regulatory failures with outworker 
protections. This article used these three concerns as a basis to analyse OHS 
legislative reforms, which have attempted to redress the plight of outworkers. 
The second part of this article analysed in detail how OHS reforms have 
sought to remedy the plight of outworkers. This article concluded that these 
legislative reforms provided outworkers with a prima facie entitlement to 
OHS protection, but failed to impose duties upon retailers. The fourth part of 
this article explored how OHS duties have been enforced in practice. After a 
detailed comparison between suppliers’ obligations under OHS laws and 
suppliers’ conduct, as demonstrated by research, this article concluded 
outworkers’ OHS protection is not enforced in practice. 
 
In order to improve the situation of outworkers, this article has explored how 
existing mandatory retail codes in New South Wales and South Australia 
could be expanded to include disclosure requirements related to outworkers’ 
OHS. Currently these codes ensure other labour conditions are met by 
requiring suppliers and retailers to disclose records to each other and to retain 
those records. Those records can then be subject to inspections by public 
agencies or by unions on routine investigations or based upon a complaint. 
As suppliers are already required by OHS to manage their outworkers’ OHS, 
requiring suppliers to then keep records of how they manage their 
outworkers’ OHS would not impose a substantial burden upon suppliers. The 
requirement for suppliers to provide such records to retailers, and for 
suppliers and retailers to make such documents available for inspection by 
public agencies and unions, would impose a small financial expense, but 
could provide substantial increases in the enforcement of outworkers’ OHS. 
The increased obligations in disclosure and document retention across the 
supply chain would render it more difficult for rogue agents to violate labour 
conditions, and would consequently reduce the number of parties who keep 
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their costs low through violating labour conditions. When the expense in 
producing, disclosing and retaining records is compared to the cost to 
outworkers’ physical safety, this article concludes, existing retail supply 
chain regulation should be extended to expressly include OHS protection for 
outworkers. 
 
 
